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1 Introduction
Seldom was a proclaimed consensus in macroeconomics so short-lived as the
acceptance of the so called `New Consensus Model'. As late as 2007, the
Journal of Economic Perspective run a special issue on this supposed con-
vergence in macroeconomic thinking towards an adoption of the model class
which is in more technical terms refered to as DSGE (for Dynamic Stochastic
General Equilibrium). Just about two years later, this model class has come
under erce attack by part of the profession including such well-known names
as Paul Krugman, Paul de Grauwe, Barry Eichengreen and Willem Buiter
as well as popular media such as the Economist (in its July 18, 2009 issue).
The issues at stake are already evident in the terminology. The term
`New Neoclassical Synthesis' { another term used for the `New Consensus'
model { tries to draw a parallel to the original neo-classical synthesis which
had dominated textbook in the discipline over decades. In this original neo-
classical synthesis, researchers of Keynesian origin such as Paul Samuelson or
Franco Modiglani tried to nd a compromise between the IS-LM model which
only focused on aggregate demand without allowing for supply constraints
and the old neo-classical macroeconomic model which only focused on the
supply side without allowing for situations in which aggregate demand falls
short of aggregate supply. Just as the old consensus tried to include both neo-
classical and Keynesian elements in its analysis, the New Consensus tried to
pull together the microfoundation and dynamic tools of (new classical) real-
business-cycle (RBC) models and the work of New Keynesians on the role of
labour and product market frictions and staggered price- and wage-setting.
A typical DSGE model thus is based on utility-maximising representative
agents with rational expectations (elements from the RBC-tradition) and
includes some staggered price-setting and monopolistic competition (which
are traditionally seen as New Keynesian element).
In this tradition of uniting a vast range of economists on one theoretical
and methodological platform, Blanchard (2008, p. 7) in a paper called `The
State of Macro' explicitely relates the developments of the decade until 2008
to Samuelson's quote from 1955 that 90 percent of economists at that time
bought into the neo-classical synthesis:
I would guess we are not yet at such a corresponding stage
today. But we may be getting there.
A few pages later (p. 24), Blanchard illustrates more in detail which
importance DSGE models had by then attained in the profession:
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DSGE models have become ubitous. Dozens of teams of re-
searchers are involved in their construction. Nearly every central
bank has one, or wants to have one. They are used to evaluate
policy rules, to do conditional forecasting, or even sometimes to
do actual forecasting.
In fact, Blanchard did not exaggerate. What he did not mention is that
even today (and possibly more so just prior to the crisis), a large share of
macroeconomic articles in the `Top 5'-journals actually include some kind
of DSGE model. For the now { and still, even if increasingly criticised {
standard approach of modern central banking, ination targeting, DSGE
models provide the theoretical foundation. When the American Economic
Association launched a new journal on macroeconomics, called American
Economic Journal: Macroeconomics in 2008, almost a third of the articles
in the issue dealt explicitely with DSGE models.
Even a number of traditional Keynesian and Post Keynesian have at
least partly moved towards the DSGE model and have tried to work with the
model or at least started accepting it as the standard tool for macroeconomic
analysis even if they remained critical of parts of the framework1, an attention
which the RBC-models never managed to get. Obviously, in their eyes, the
set-up and policy conclusions of DSGE models had been a clear progress
over earlier approaches to modeling central banking such as the monetarist
approach which in the end advocated money supply targeting as an optimum
policy.
However, the consensus obviously was not as broad or stable as Blanchard
and others had thought. With the eruption of the US subprime crisis and its
transformation into a global nancial and economic crisis compared to the
Great Depression, the convergence towards this model class has come under
harsh re from economists inside and outside academia. Buiter (2009) calls
them `a costly waste of time', Krugman (2009) clearly includes them into
his description of macroeconomic work of the past decades as `spectacularly
useless at best, and positively harmful at worst'. The Economist voices its
unease with these models which have neither been able to predict the crisis,
been able to forecast its depth or trajectory nor to give useful policy guide-
lines on how to overcome the crisis. Consequently, the journalists propose
implicitely to start again from scratch for building a useful macroeconomic
model.
1See i.e. Fontana (2009), Arestis, ed (2007) and contributions in that volume or alter-
natively the contributions in Fontana and Settereld, eds (2009).
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While these critics can still be cast aside as mavericks of the profession,
with such prominent voices trashing the DSGE models, one can hardly talk
about a `consensus model' anymore. What is quite evident is, that { should
DSGE models ever again be accepted as a macroeconomic consensus { they
need to be seriously repaired and extended. What is less clear is whether
these models actually can be repaired and extended so that they again can
become the basis for a broad consensus or if they have aws which make
them permanently unaccaptable to part of the economics profession.
To answer this question, this paper will take a deeper look at the un-
derlying mechanics of the DSGE model from a traditional Keynesian and
Post Keynesian perspective. The Post Keynesian perspective is included ex-
plicitely into this analysis as at least some of the Post Keynesian literature in
the form of Hyman Minsky's writings on crisis phenonema have gained new
prominence during the crisis, while other authors from this school of thought
had moved towards (at least partly) accepting the DSGE models prior to the
crisis.
This paper will not dwell much on the standard { and often voiced (Buiter,
2009; Spaventa, 2009) { criticism such as that DSGE models abstract from -
nancial intermediaries and do not allow for asset price bubbles. This criticism
is well accepted even by (some of) the DSGE proponents and is increasingly
tackled by adding some ad hoc nancial sector formalisation to the standard
model. Instead, the paper will focus more on question such as the determi-
nation of income and employment as well as the transmission mechanisms of
monetary and scal policy to the economy in DSGE models. In doing so, it
will tackle two questions: First, it will try to give an explanation why the
DSGE model has come so close to being an accepted consensus. Second, it
will try to answer whether it is worthwhile for traditional Keynesians and
Post Keynesians to proceed with the DSGE research agenda.
The paper will start with describing the basic elements of a standard
DSGE model and its origins. In a second step, it will try to nd out why
the DSGE model and its cousins have found so much approval among tradi-
tional Keynesians and Post-Keynesians. Section 4 will then point out some
problems of DSGE models from a traditional Keynesian and Post-Keynesian
perspective. Building on this analysis, section 5 will have a look at the DSGE
models from a policy evaluation perspective and section 6 will conclude.
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2 Main elements of DSGE modeling
While literally hundreds of DSGE models exist today with dierent details in
the formulations, they all have a number of characteristics in common, some
of them are even reected in the very term. First, DSGE models are dynamic.
In the tradition of RBC models, they usually start from the individual utility
function of a rational, representative agent2 who tries to maximise his utility
over an innite horizon varying labour supply and demand for consumption
goods in each period.
Second, DSGE models contain a stochastic element: An usual research
approach is to check how the model behaves (and nds back to its equilib-
rium) after it is hit by a stochastic shock.
Third, DSGE models are general equilibrium models: All markets, includ-
ing the labour and goods market are always in equilibrium. As we will see
later, this is a crucial characteristic.
When used as a tool for policy evaluation (i.e. for determining which
monetary policy function is preferable), DSGE models are usually applied in
a four-stage process:
1. Appropriate optimization conditions for rms and households are cho-
sen
2. For analytical simplicity, the reaction of households and rms around
the steady state are formulated by log-linearization of the optimization
problems
3. `Deep' parameters (i.e. for time preference) for the model are chosen.
Two approaches are in use: Originally, there seemed to be a preference
for some `calibration', setting the parameters in a way that the general
outcome of the model ts well with real-world data, using human intu-
ition after starting from some `priors', parameters widely accepted in
the DSGE literature. In recent years, however, calibration has made
place for the application of complex econometric procedures such as
the generalized method of moments (GMM), maximum likelihood or
Bayesian estimation methods which are now mostly used for setting
the parameters3
2Note that some DSGE models now allow for heterogeneous agents.
3See for an accessible discussion of the question of calibration vs. estimation Tovar
(2008) or for a more technical discussion Bierens (2007).
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4. In a computer simulation, dierent policy reaction functions are ex-
posed to stochastic shocks, analysing which of the policy functions
minimizes a social loss function
More technically, a typical DSGE model has the following elements:
2.1 Household utility maximisation


















with  as the discount factor, u(:) as the (positive) utility derived from
consumption, v (:) as the utility derived from holding real balances and  (:)
as the disutility from working. Ct denotes consumption in period t, Mt the
nominal money holdings, Pt the price level and Nt the individual labour
supply in period t.
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with Bt denoting the amount of bonds held by the individual in period t,
Wt the wage in period t and t prot income.
In order to make sure that the individual does not continously increase
her debt, a Non-Ponzi-condition is added, saying that the present value of
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This maximisation gives us the following optimality conditions for the
relationships between Ct and Mt;Bt;Nt:4
u































One can now log-linearize (6) around the steady-state in order to get the
optimum relationship between Ct and Ct+1. Dening ct and ct+1 as the log
deviation of consumption from steady-state consumption, we get:5
ct = Etct+1  
1

(it   Ett+1   ) (9)
it here denotes the log of the gross yield on a one-period bond that can
be interpreted as the nominal interest rate for reasonable low values of the
interest rate (Gal , 2008, p. 18).  is the rate of time preference and dened
as    log.
2.2 Firms' price setting
Firms in standard DSGE models are monopolistically competitive as has been
proposed by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). This result is based on modelling
aggregate consumption Ct in the utility function as the consumption of a
continuum of goods indexed by i 2 [0;1] which are only imperfect substitutes,















4Note that we have chosen a general exposition here rather than using a clearly dened
functional form of the utility function as has been done in Gal  (2008). However, our
exposition can easily be transformed in something similar to the Gal -exposition.
5For details on the process of log-linearization, see Gal  (2008, p. 35)
6This consumption function is hence often refered to as a constant elasticity of substi-
tution or CES-consumption function.
7See i.e. Gal  (2008, p. 41).
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Given that the household thus values variety and only sees the dierent goods
as imperfect substitutes, rms have some pricing power.
As there is a continuum of goods, there is also a continuum of rms
i 2 [0;1] which each produces the corresponding good. They all use identical
technology and have thus an identical production function:
Yt = AtNt (i)
1  (11)
If we maximise the consumption index Ct given the prices for the contin-
uum of goods Pt (i) and a given level of expenditure as the budget constraint,







The demand for each rm's product is thus a negative function of the
product's relative price and a positive function of total expenditure. Given
the production function above and the demand function, a rm can maximise
its prots by applying a markup of "
" 1 over (nominal) marginal unit labour
costs MCt as is known from the literature on monopolistic competition. Note
that all rms apply the same price as they are symmetrical. This yields an







In addition to monopolistic competition, however, DSGE models usually
contain some kind of staggered price setting. Usually, the approach used by
Calvo (1983) is applied. According to this approach, in each period, a rm
is only allowed with the probability of 1    to reset its price. Thus,  can
be interpreted as a measure of price stickiness. Given the knowledge of this
restriction, rms are now trying to set their prices in a way that maximises
prots over an innite price horizon, trying to get their expected price close
to the expected prot-maximising price as dened above. Ination in this
context appears, because the rms able to reset their prices will do so which
results in a change of the aggregate price level.
As Gal  (2008, p. 45) derives, one gets for the price equation around the
zero-ination steady state
8Again, this is derived in Gal  (2008). For a more general and atemporal exposition of
monopolistic competition, see Blanchard and Fischer (1989).
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with  again denoting the discount factor, and  being dened as the
log "
" 1 and mc being dened as the log of the marginal costs. Hence, rms
set prices at a level at which they expect to achieve their desired mark-up
over (weighted) current and expected future nominal marginal costs.
2.3 The results: Three macroeconomic equations
To the above equations, the assumptions of constant market-clearing is added,
both in the goods and in the labour market. Since there is no capital invest-
ment and no government sector in the baseline model, market clearing for
the goods market requires that consumption demand equals production:
Yt = Ct (15)
Using this condition and equation (9), one gets an equation showing the
deviation of current output from steady state output:
yt = Etyt+1  
1

(it   Ett+1   ) (16)
One can substitute the discount term  by some natural interest rate rn
t
and rewrite the equation in terms of the output gap e yt :
e yt = Ete yt+1  
1

(it   Ett+1   r
n
t ) (17)
This is what is often referred to as the New Keynesian IS-curve and is
one of the three central reduced-form equations of the DSGE models.
Adding the assumption for market clearing in the labour market, after a
few mathematical manipulations9 one gets for the ination dynamics:
t = Ett+1 + e yt (18)
9We do not go into the algebraic steps for this part but again refer to Gal  (2008) for
details.
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This equation is also often referred to as the New Keynesian Phillips
Curve or NKPC. It is the second of the three central equations of the DSGE
models.
However, the NKPC and the New Keynesian IS-curve by themselves do
not form a stable system. In order to keep the system from exploding paths
in case of a shock, a central bank reaction function has to be added which
relates the short-term interest rate to ination and the output gap. Usually,
a rule of the following form is chosen:
it = r

t + 't + 'ye yt (19)
This monetary policy reaction function is the third of the three central
equations of a DSGE model. This function can be easily rewritten to have
the functional form of a traditional Taylor rule for monetary policy which is
often presented as it = r
t +  (t   
t) + y (yt   y
t).
Thus, many DSGE models depict the actions of a central bank only by
the short-term interest rate. An explicit money supply, in contrast, is not
included. However, one can easily introduce a money supply into the model.
In this case, mS






and one gets the money supply as being an endogenous
function of the utility derived from holding money, the nominal interest rate






(it   Ett + 1) (20)
3 DSGE's appeal to (some) (Post-)Keynesians
Many Keynesians and Post-Keynesians struck the emergence of the New
Keynesian Synthesis and the DSGE models as a progress over New Classi-
cal macroeoconomic models in the tradition of Lucas (1972). For example,
Arestis, ed (2007) and Fontana and Settereld, eds (2009) have published col-
lections in which the New Keynesian Synthesis is approached, applied and
extended (and { to be fair { of course also been criticised10) from traditional
Keynesian and Post-Keynesian points of view.
10Especially Arestis has criticised the New Keynesian Synthesis or New Consensus Model
quite extensively. See i.e. Arestis (2009) and his references to his former works on the
topic.
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A number of reasons might be at the heart of the symphathy of even
prominent Keynesians and Post Keynesians towards the DSGE models. First,
monopolistic competition is one of the central beliefs in Post-Keynesian eco-
nomics. Building on the insights of Robinson (1933), Post Keynesians gener-
ally refute the notion of perfect competition and thus allow for some mark-
up-pricing.11 Traditional Keynesianism also used to follow the notion of
imperfect competition, yet as macroeconomic models became more formal-
ized, this notion fell into disregard until Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) propozed
a way to formalize monopolistic competition. Thus, a macroeconomic model
such as the DSGE model which includes monopolistic competition as a main
building block might have struck some chords with traditional Keynesians
and Post-Keynesians.
Second, the new IS-curve from equation (17) at rst sight looks very
familiar to a traditional IS curve which is usually presented in the following
form:
Y = C0 + cY + I (i) + G (21)
with C0 as autonomous consumption, c as the marginal propensity to
consume, I as investment demand, i as the interest rate and G as govern-
ment expenditure. While of course the economic meaning diers between a
traditional IS-curve from Hick's IS-LM model and the new IS-curve in the
DSGE model (we will come to this point further down), one could at rst
sight believe that the mechanisms at work are similar.
Third, monetary policy in the DSGE models is conducted by a central
bank changing interest rates, and the money supply is endogenous. This is
something Post-Keynesian authors have long argued in favor of. One of the
central tenets of Post Keynesian economics has always been the assumption
of endogenous money (Moore, 1988; Wray, 1990). According to this view,
the central bank cannot well control the amount of base money in circulation
nor wider monetary aggregates as it depends on the demand for loans from
the private sector and the willingness of the banking sector to expand the
money supply. The main instrument for monetary policy in Post Keynesian
theory is hence the central bank interest rate.12 Again, at rst sight, this
looks very similar to the approach taken by the DSGE model-builders. In the
DSGE models, the relevant variable for monetary policy is the central bank
11See for a thorough description of Post-Keynesian approaches to pricing Lavoie (2001).
12For an up-to-date exposition of the mechanisms of endogenous money creation in Post
Keynesian theory, see Dullien (2004).
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interest rate which is directly set by the central bank. The money supply in
contrast is only determined endogenously, in a stark contrast to monetary
macroeconomic models in the tradition of Lucas (1972) or Taylor (1980) in
which money is injected into the economy as it was dropped by a helicopter,
to use the famous Friedman parable.
In addition to these theoretical arguments, DSGE models seem to come
to (at least some) policy conclusions which are very much in line with Post-
Keynesian or traditional Keynesian thinking. First, there is no self-stabilizing
of the system thanks to a real balance eect in DSGE models anymore. In
models based on the old neo-classical synthesis, a fall in the price level would
always lead to a self-stabiliziation even without policy reaction: Given a
certain stock of (nominal) money in the economy, a fall in the price level in
the old model leads to an increase in aggregate demand as the individuals'
wealth increases which leads to more consumption (the Pigou eect) or more
lending (the Keynes eect). Thus, even faced with a large demand shock
(i.e. as a consequence in the shift in preferences), the economy would nd
quickly back to full employment given exible prices as a falling price level
would increase the real aggregate demand for consumption and investment
goods. In the DSGE world, this is dierent: A deationary shock is well able
to keep output below steady-state output (or { in the way the term is used
in the DSGE literature { the output gap positive) for an extended period
of time as Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) show. The reason is that due
to the zero bound of nominal interest rates, the central bank cannot lower
nominal interest into negative territory and might therefore be unable to keep
short term real interest rates low enough to increase economic activity to the
point where the output gap closes. Hence, in contrast to the monetarist
conclusion that the central bank should target a slightly negative ination
rate (Friedman, 1969), DSGE models usually come to the conclusion that
in order to prevent a long period of sub-trend growth in the aftermath of a
deationary shock, the central bank should aim at a moderate positive rate
of ination.
Moreover, an optimal central bank reaction function in a DSGE model
usually includes a reaction to both the deviation from the ination target as
well as the output gap. Again, this is something Keynesians can generally
relate to. In general, most traditional Keynesians believe in monetary policy's
ability of inuencing economic activity13 and hence are in favor to use the
short-term interest rates to bring output close to full-employment output {
13This holds true even if they also believe that their might be cases in which monetary
policy alone cannot bring the economy back to full employment and hence suggest scal
policy to be applied.
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in contrast to Monetarists and New Classical Economists who either reject
monetary policy activism either because of their scepticism in the central
bank's ability to monitor and predict business cycle uctuations or because
of their general belief in macroeconomic policy ineectiveness due to the
private sector's rational reactions to government action. Thus, compared
to Friedman's money supply rule which did not see any role for activist
monetary policy, DSGE models at rst sight seemed like a progress from the
traditional and Post-Keynesian perspective.
4 Problems with DSGE from a (Post-) Key-
nesian perspective
However, on closer inspection, some of the underlying mechanisms in DSGE
models are completely dierent from what traditional Keynesians or Post
Keynesians believe about the workings of the real-world economy. In fact, the
DSGE models' links of causation are so dierent from a traditional Keynesian
or Post-Keynesian understanding of macroeconomics that one can wonder
how there can be any scope to reconcile the two positions.
4.1 Unemployment and the Output Gap
The rst issue is the output gap. In Keynesian models (and a traditional
Keynesian understanding of the economy), the output gap would be the gap
between potential output and current output. The existence of such a gap
is explained with aggregate demand falling short of potential supply and
thus preventing the economy from producing at potential output. Of course,
Keynesian economists from Post-Keynesian and a more traditional Keynesian
provinence might dier about the question why aggregate demand falls short
of potential output over an extended period of time. While Post-Keynesians
would argue that uncertainty and uctuations in the rms' animal spirits
might keep investment demand too low to guarantee full employment, Key-
nesians more closely aligned with the (old) neo-classical synthesis would ar-
gue that sticky nominal wages due to labour market rigidities might play a
role as they keep real wages from falling and hence business investment de-
pressed. However, both would agree that in the case of a negative output gap
and hence employment below the (however dened) level of full employment,
some people in the economy would like to work at the given wage rate, but
are unable to nd employment (the denition of involuntary unemployment
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Keynes (1936) has given).
The mechanism in DSGE models is fundamentally dierent. Here, one has
to remember that labour markets always clear (at least in the basic models
without additional elements such as a monopoly union which might prevent
wages from adjusting). This assumption has been used for deriving the New
Keynesian Phillips curve and it is at the heart of the adjustment mechanism
how a DSGE model adjusts to shocks.14 To understand this issue, one has
to take a closer look at the individuals' utility function in equation (1).
Maximisation of the individuals' utility takes place by variations of the paths
of their consumption demand, their labour supply and their money holdings
over time. These paths only deviate from their steady-state value if interest
rates or real wages deviate from their respective steady state values. Lower
interest rates lead to more money holdings and more present consumption
(as the opportunity costs both of holding money and consuming more in the
present period fall) which in turn inuences the real wage via higher demand
in the goods and labour markets (see below for more on this mechanism).
The central variation in output, however, is caused by variation of labour
supply. If the real wage deviates from the steady state value, individuals
reoptimize their labour supply and hence hours worked and output produced
in the economy. Real wages higher than in the steady state case cause them
to increase their labour supply, real wages below the steady state value cause
them to lower their labour supply. Higher labour supply then leads to higher
output which is consumed as households can aord to do so thanks to higher
wages.
Fluctuations in employment in the DSGE models are hence always an
optimal reaction of households to changes in labour market conditions. A
temporary increase of employment above the steady-state level is thereby
caused by an increase in the real wage to which the households react by
cutting back their leisure and supplying more working hours in the labour
markets. Similarly, a fall of employment below the steady-state level in the
DSGE model is caused by a fall in the real wage. Households then react to
the lower real wage by cutting back their labour supply. Hence, there is no
involuntary unemployment in DSGE models, just voluntary unemployment
as a reaction to changes in the wage or to changes in lifetime income. Or, to
put it in more graphic ways: Those who seem unemployed are just enjoying
14As many of the textbooks on DSGE models drown this mechanism in the mathematical
derivation of the model equations and it is quite dicult to see this issue clearly at rst
sight in the dynamic equations, it is sometimes helpful to take a look at a simpler two-
period model with a similar set-up as the dynamic DSGE models. Chapter 6 in Heijdra
and van der Ploeg (2002) is a good option to do so.
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more leisure this year because they expect their real wages to be higher next
year when they are in consequence going to work longer hours then.
Changes in the interest rate also work exactly in this way: While in tra-
ditional Keynesian thinking, a cut in interest rates might induce either rms
to invest more in their physical capital or households to buy more consumer
durables, thus increasing aggregate demand and bringing formerly involun-
tarily employed workers into new jobs, the causal chain in DSGE models is
completely dierent: A cut in interest here makes consumption today rela-
tively more attractive than consumption tomorrow. Hence, households will
try to shift some of their lifetime consumption towards the current period.
As both the goods market and the labour market were already clearing be-
fore the interest rate cut (hence everyone who wanted to work at the going
wage rate had a job and all goods were sold and consumed), this increase in
consumption leads to excess demand. As rms try to hire new workers to
satisfy this demand, nominal wages increase. As prices are (partly) sticky
thanks to the Calvo pricing, this additional consumption demand leads to
an increase in real wages and a compression of prots. Higher real wages in
turn lead the households to oer more labour (substituting leisure for work)
which in turn leads to a new (higher employment) temporary equilibrium in
the labour market.
The reason for uctuations in output and employment in DSGE models is
hence not that wages are sticky and therefore an adjustment of real wages to
shocks cannot take place (as it has been in the xed-wage version of the old
neo-classical synthesis) nor is it that aggregate demand can just fall short of
supply because of a lack of an inherent tendency to full-employment output
(as claimed by the Post-Keynesians). Instead, the reason for uctuations is
that nominal wages are exible, but prices are not and hence demand shocks
change nominal and real wages more quickly than prices which leads to high-
frequency changes in the labour supply.15 The DSGE model is a model in
which nominal wages and quantities adjust instantaneously while nominal
prices can only adjust with a lag. When putting it this way, one wonders
how many traditional Keynesians or Post-Keynesians would actually sign up
for this explanation of unemployment.
15In addition to the question whether this mechanism is compatible with more tra-
ditional Keynesian thinking, one could also ask in how far these assumption have any
plausibility for a reasonable description of real-world goods and labour markets. To our
knowledge, there is no empirical evidence which could claim that prices are less exible
than nominal wages especially as nominal wages exhibit usually a downward stickiness. In
fact, Bils and Klenow (2004) report that prices are changed on average every four months,
while wage negotiations in most countries take place annually.
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4.2 Endogenous Money
The second issue is the question of endogenous money. In the Post-Keynesian
tradition, there is a broad and deep discussion on why and how money is
endogenous. Usually endogenous money is used to model the interaction be-
tween a central bank and the real economy which Post-Keynesians often feel
has been abstracted away in more mainstream approaches. First, it is often
argued that the broad money supply is endogenous as it does not only in-
clude base money (which can be created by the central bank), but also inside
credit money which is created by the banking sector. The willingness and
the ability (measured in the availability of equity capital or other regulatory
constraints) of the banking sector is a necessary condition for the expansion
of the money supply. Moreover, to expand the money supply, there must be
enough rms in the economy which are willing to borrow money for prof-
itable investment projects so that the banking sector has enough good-risk
potential borrowers.
In addition, it is often argued that even base money is not exogenous,
but endogenous to the central bank's actions (Dullien, 2004, p. 73). Three
arguments can be made here: First, the commercial banks do not need to
engage in the sale of securities with the central bank thus making open market
operations futile. Second, as the money supply has proved to be unstable
in many countries, central banks nowadays often set the short-term interest
rate and accommodate whichever amount of base money commercial banks
would like to hold. Third (very important especially in the light of the recent
nancial crisis), central banks might have inherent interest in securing the
stability of the banking system. As a shortage of liquidity in the nancial
system might lead to a banking crises, they are thus forced to supply the
amount of base money commercial banks are demanding, thus making the
money supply endogenous.
In short, Post-Keynesian theory uses endogenous money to show the com-
plexeties of the nancial system in the transmission of monetary policy.
Moreover, endogenous money in Post-Keynesian thinking is a way to
transfer purchasing power from surplus units (which save) to decit units
(which spend more than their cash ow) in the economy. As usually house-
holds are surplus units and rms are seen as decit units, it is also possible
of thinking of endogenous money as a means to transfer purchasing power
from risk-averse, less entrepreneurial individuals to more risk-seeking, more
entrepreneurial individuals which use the purchasing power for the creation
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of xed assets.16
Again, the logic of money supply in DSGE is fundamentally dierent,
even if it seems similar at rst sight. Most DSGE models do not include
a nancial sector.17 In fact, this is one of the very reasons why this class
of models has lately received a lot of criticism even from papers like the
Economist.
Further, money in DSGE models is not used to transfer purchasing power,
neither between units or between periods. As all individuals are identical
(being a result of the representative agent approach) at least in the baseline
DSGE models, there are no surplus and no decit units. Everyone is just
consuming what she is earning. By logic of aggregation and also embedded
in the market clearing assumption for the goods market Ct = Yt, this means
that macroeconomically, there are also no savings in the simple DSGE model.
While the baseline model { as we have done with equation (2) usually in-
troduces a capital market (at which the interest rate i is paid), no agent is
borrowing and no agent is lending in this market as the adjustment always
runs via the goods and labour market. The holding of bonds is just 0 in
these models in all periods.18
In consequence, the money supply is not determined (as in Post-Keynesian
thinking) by the private sector's willingness to incur debt and by the nan-
cial sector's willingness to extend loans, but by the individuals' willingness to
hold money for liquidity services. As we see from the money supply equation
(20), the individuals' utility from money holdings v plays a central role for
the determination of the money supply with the interest it and the expected
rate of ination Ett+1 having a negative eect as the individuals balance
the opportunity costs of holding cash with the utility from doing so. Thus,
the central bank in DSGE models just provides money by some unspecied
process until the public's desire to hold money is satised at the targeted
interest rate.
4.3 Government spending
Another issue which shows the fundamental dierences between the DSGE
models and traditional or Post-Keynesian thinking is the question of the
16For more on this argument, see Tobin (1998) or Dullien (2004).
17The question in how far these problems of DSGE models can be mitigated by recent
extensions is covered later in this paper.
18Of course, this changes if one introduces a government sector which nances expendi-
ture by borrowing. See below.
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eect of government spending on economic activity. The basic DSGE model
presented in this paper so far does not yet include a government sector.
However, one could easily include government activity into the model. The
simplest way to do so would be to introduce a lump-sum tax to be paid
by households with which government expenditure is nanced. This would
mean that the households' budget contraint (3) is altered by including the
tax term on the right-hand side and that also the goods market clearing
condition is expanded by government expenditure. In addition, we assume
for a moment that the government does not borrow, but nances all its
current expenditures with current tax revenue:
YtPt = NtWt + t   Tt (22)
Yt = Ct + Gt (23)
Tt = Gt (24)
If government activity is introduced in this model in this way, a change
in government spending has the following eects: A tax-nanced increase
in government spending leads rst to a negative income eect of the single
household as the tax money is taken away while the household does not
have any utility from government spending. As a reaction, the household
will cut back both on its consumption of goods and on its leisure time (as
both consumption and leisure enter as incomplete substitutes into the utility
function). The result is that the single household is supplying more labour
to the labour market. Firms demand this additional labour as they are faced
with higher aggregate demand in the goods market (due to the additional
government purchases). As the labour market and the goods market always
clear in the DSGE model, the households have no problem supplying more
work. The labour market thus clears at a higher level of employment (since
labour supply has increased). The goods market clears at a higher level of
production, but with lower private consumption than before.19
This basic mechanism also holds if we drop the restriction that the gov-
ernment has to nance all current expenditure from current tax revenue
(equation 24) and instead introduce an inter-temporal budget constraint and
a non-Ponzi condition for the government which requires the public sector
19Also note that the increase in government spending has lowered the households' utility
even though output and employment has increased. If one takes the individual utility
serious as a measure of economic welfare, there would be a strong case against such a
scal policy.
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not to engage in explosive borrowing trends. In this case, a debt-nanced in-
crease of current government spending has the following eect: As households
now expect that they have to pay higher taxes in the future (to service the
government debt), they perceive the increase in government spending as a fall
in their lifetime income and hence total wealth. Due to this negative wealth
eect, they again cut back on current consumption as well as on current
leisure, meaning that they supply more labour to at least partly make up for
the taxes they have to pay. In contrast to the case described above without
the government sector, these households now save. They hold government
bonds exactly with the present value of their future tax liabilities caused by
the government debt. As in the case for tax-nanced government expen-
diture, output and employment increases while private consumption falls.20
The DSGE model hence incorporates Ricardian equivalence as it does not
make any dierence whether additional government spending is paid for by
new taxes or new government debt.
Again, this whole mechanism is completely dierent from traditional Key-
nesian or Post-Keynesian understanding of the eects of scal policy (and
{ by the way { from the narrative that has been used by economists in the
recent political debate on the stimulus packages passed in most industrial-
ized countries). In the standard IS-LM equation, an increase in government
spending leads not only to an increase of total output via the well-known
multiplier eects, but also to an increase in private consumption. Moreover,
the extent to which output is increased depends critically on the way how
an increase in government expenditure is nanced with debt nance leading
to a higher multiplier.21 In a situation of underemployment, the increase in
output caused by the expansionary scal policy actually helps households to
sell their labour supplied in the labour market. Thus, households are clearly
better o as involuntary unemployment is reduced and their consumption
increased.
20Note that the full dynamic of the eects of changes in government spending cannot
be seen from the reduced form equations (the new IS-curve and the NKPC of the DSGE
models as they only show deviations from the steady-state, but a change in government
expenditure shifts the steady state. For a more in-depth discussion of the eects of gov-
ernment spending in this class of model, see the discussion in Gal  et al. (2007) and in the
literature cited there, especially Aiyagari et al. (1992) or Fat as and Mihov (2001). For a
simple, non-dynamic exposition of this eect, see Heijdra and van der Ploeg (2002, chapter
13).
21This mechanism is described in most undergraduate textbooks such as Blanchard
(2006).
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4.4 Extensions in order to mitigate problems
To be fair to the DSGE literature, one has to report that a lot of the authors
coming from a more Keynesian tradition (as compared to the authors com-
ing from the real business cycle tradition) have tried to square the eects
of government spending predicted by the DSGE models with a more tradi-
tional Keynesian thinking which also seems to be supported by the empirical
literature.
The most widely cited attempt to do so is probably Gal  et al. (2007).
Here, the authors introduce two dierent kinds of households. A rst type
(dubbed 'optimizing') is behaving as in the standard DSGE model, max-
imising lifetime utility over an innite horizon. A second type of house-
holds (dubbed `rule-of-thumb' consumers) always spends all labour income
on present period consumption. However, `rule-of-thumb' does not mean that
the households are not optimizing at all. They still optimize their present
consumption against their present leisure time so that marginal utility from
these two variables needs to be equal. They just do not have access to nan-
cial markets and can hence neither save nor borrow.22
If the share of rule-of-thumb consumers in an economy is large enough,
the model presented by Gal  et al. (2007) now shows a reaction which is more
in line with the traditional Keynesian percention. An increase in government
spending is now able both to increase output and private consumption.
However, even now, the mechanism is distinctly dierent from traditional
and (Post-)Keynesian thinking. Now, given an debt-nanced increase in
government expenditure, only the optimizing households cut back on current
consumption, while the rule-of-thumb consumers continue to spend whatever
they earn. Thus, the demand for goods increases more strongly than in
the DSGE model without 'rule-of-thumb' households. As rms react to this
higher demand with increased production plans, nominal wages in the labour
market are bid up. As a result, real wages increase as a consequence of
sluggishness in prices. This increase in real wages leads to a substitution at
the household level away from leisure towards more consumption as leisure
gets relatively more expensive. Hence, the individuals supply more labour in
22In addition to the question in how far the mechanism described by the model actu-
ally ts a traditional Keynesian understanding of the economy, one can again doubt the
plausibility of such an assumption: While in the real world there are surely a number
of households which cannot borrow, it is hard to come up with reasons why households
should not be able to save. This point is especially important as the rule-of-thumb house-
holds can hardly been interpreted as households just not optimizing as they are always
optimizing present-period consumption against present-period leisure.
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the labour market beyond the initial eect from the negative wealth eect
caused by the increase in government expenditure.
While this outcome in the macroeconomic data now looks more like a
traditional Keynesian result, the mechanism again is not: The reason for
the increase in employment is an increase in the real wage and thus a larger
willingness of individuals to work. Again, as in the simpler versions presented
above, the uctuation in employment due to the government activities is a
reaction of the labour supply. All unemployment in this model necessarily
remains voluntarily.
5 DSGE for policy evaluation
However, even if one does not like the way the model works in the microe-
conomic details, one might ask whether DSGE models might not be a useful
tool for simulating the path of the economy given a specic shock, examining
the consequences of dierent policy options and nally make policy recom-
mendations? Unfortunately, upon closer examination, this turns out not to
be the case.
To understand this issue, we need to take a look at the DSGE approach
from a philosophy of science perspective: Assume that there are a number n
of economic models to describe the working of the economy. Some might be
based on microfoundations, some might be based on ad-hoc macroeconomic
equations and some might include theoretically completely unfounded ele-
ments such as the sun-spot activity in a distant galaxy. If the number n is
large enough, we will always be able to nd a number of models from each
subgroup which ts the real-world data (which has necessarily only a limited
number of observations as national accounting only started relatively late in
human history) within standard limits of statistical condence intervals.
However, just that we have found a model which can explain the past
economic activity well by relating it to the sunspot activity in Alpha Cen-
taury does not mean that it is a useful model for future forecasting or policy
advise. In fact, the mathematical economist William Stanley Jevons used
sunspot activity successfully for some years in the 19th century to forecast
stock market crashes, yet later failed clearly with this approach.23
This point might be also illustrated by a less far-fetched example. In the
1960s and 1970s, in the research for artical intelligence, progress was often
23See Fox (2009, p. 16).
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measured by the so called Turing test. According to this test, proposed by
Turing (1950), a computer will be considered as intelligent if human beings
cannot distinguish in communcation with the machine whether they are ac-
tually communicating with a machine or another human being. For a while,
computer scientists tried to improve their software according to the turing
test. The best-known example for this king of software is Eliza, a software
which simulates a psychiatrist's dialogue with a patient.24 Even though Eliza
only reacted to key phrases, it was already able to fool some humans inter-
acting with it. Nowadays, the software is much more elaborated. A.L.I.C.E.
tries to simulate an online chat with a young lady in California. As readers
can nd out themselves,25 the result is quite astonishing and it is rather hard
to notice that you are not chatting with a fellow human being.
Yet, even if the software nowadays is rather sophisticated, the practical
use of such software is extremely limited. Is it doubtful that one could
sensibly simulate the reaction of human beings to any real-world problem
with these tools. No one in his or her right mind would actually use these
programs to simulate how their spouse would react if one wants to tell him or
her about adultury or how their mother-in-law would react if one cancels the
long-promised Christmas visit. Consequently, there are very few practical
uses for this kind of software.
Not surprisingly, the Turing test has fallen out of fashion in the quest for
artical intelligence and in computer science. Software as Eliza and its suc-
cessors are nowadays seen as a nice gimmick, but not more. As the Economist
nicely put it in a recent survey on articial intelligence, the turing test is now
seen as a `distraction from useful lines of research'.
Of course, DSGE models are not based on random relationships as the
model relating economic activity on earth to sun spots in Alpha Centaury,
but based on rigorous theoretical and assumptions priors (as those explained
above). Yet, if one does not accept those priors (not as being unrealistic,
but as being plainly wrong), one denitely must reject these models also for
policy analysis. If one believes the fundamental workings of the model to be
awed, using the model nevertheless for policy analysis is nothing else than
following a Turing approach to economic modelling. Any Keynesian who has
trouble with the causalities at the heart of the model described above hence
should be very wary to accept them for any use outside the classroom and
academic journals.
24You can nd the original version of Eliza at http://www-ai.ijs.si/eliza/eliza.html
25The internet address is http://www.pandorabots.com/pandora/talk?botid=f5d922d97e345aa1
.
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In addition, there is even a certain parallel between the DSGE models and
pursuing artical intelligence with the Turing test if one philosophically ac-
cepts the supply side determination of output and employment of the model:
The parameters in DSGE models are set (via calibration or estimation) to
t the real-world data reasonable well, that is to produce an output to the
input of shocks that looks pretty much like the output of data of a real-world
economy. The microeconomic parameters thus entered into the model of-
ten suer from what An and Schorfheide (2007) call the `dilemma of absurd
parameter estimates': They are at odds with other knowledge economists
have about their magnitudes. For example, the discount rate or the elastic-
ity of the labour supply often are far o from what we usually take them
to be given microeconomic studies.26 Thus, even though researchers know
that the microeconomic working of the model must be dierent from that
of real-world economies, they try to mimic real-world data with the model.
They accept the deviation of the microeconomic mechanics of the model from
their beliefs of the microeconomic mechanisms of the real world in order to
get their model to t real world data reasonably well. This is essentially the
approach of the programmers of Eliza and its successor programs: They tried
to create an output which looks like human output even though they knew
that human beings react to more than key phrases.
One should note here that one does not have to criticize DSGE mod-
els fundamentally to doubt their use for policy evaluations. Even authors
generally in favor of the DSGE's modelling approach and its microeconomic
mechanisms doubt their applicability for policy advise as in their present
form, they contain too many degrees of freedom. For example, Chari et
al. (2009) show that two fundamentally dierent calibrations of the DSGE
with two fundamental dierent policy conclusions can lead to observationally
equivalent data output at the aggregate level. They demonstrate their case
by showing that a change on the wage mark-up in a more complicated DSGE
than presented in this paper which seems to be needed to give the model a
good t on real-world data can either be caused by swings in the unions' bar-
gaining power or by swings in the individuals' preference for leisure. While
in the one case counteracting the uctuations in output and employment
with monetary policy would increase the individuals' utility, in the second
case, it would just bring them out of their individual utility maximum, thus
harming welfare. According to Chari et al. (2009), there is no possibility
26One can counter this problem if Bayesian estimation methods are used and `priors' for
the distribution of parameters are introduced. However, these methods are not completely
without problems as the subjective choice of priors can change the estimation outcomes
and hence parameters might be chosen which are not supported by the data (Tovar, 2008).
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within standard DSGE methodology to distinguish which of the two model
specications is to be preferred.
6 Conclusion
In conclusion, one can say that the sympathy that some of the traditional
and Post-Keynesian authors show towards DSGE models is rather hard to
understand. Even before the recent nancial and economic crisis put some
weaknesses of the model { such as the impossibility of generating asset price
bubbles or the lack of inclusion of nancial sector issues { into the spotlight
and brought them even to the attention of mainstream media, the models'
inner working were highly questionable from the very beginning. While one
can understand that some of the elements in DSGE models seem to appeal
to Keynesians at rst sight, after closer examination, these models are in
fundamental contradiction to Post-Keynesian and even traditional Keynesian
thinking. The DSGE model is a model in which output is determined in the
labour market as in New Classical models and in which aggregate demand
plays only a very secondary role, even in the short run.
In addition, given the fundamental philosophical problems presented for
the use of DSGE models for policy simulation, namely the fact that a number
of parameters used have completely implausible magnitudes and that the
degree of freedom for dierent parameters is so large that DSGE models
with fundamentally dierent parametrization (and therefore dierent policy
conclusions) equally well produce time series which t the real-world data,
it is also very hard to understand why DSGE models have reached such a
prominence in economic science in general.
At least from a traditional Keynesian or Post-Keynesian tradition, one
can clearly conrm Buiter's claim that the models have been a `waste of
time'. In as far as they have shaped student's thinking about real-world
economics, they might even conrm to Krugman's judgment as `positively
harmful'. Thus, from a Keynesian research perspective, the Economist's
implicit advise to the profession `to start from scratch' seems to be warranted.
Whether the DSGE model will at some point in the future become at
least a useful tool for policy analysis if one rejects Keynesian thinking but at
least adhers to basic principles of scientic logic and will thus be acceptable
to Chari et al. (2009) and the like, is a dierent question. It is well possible
that the DSGE community will built more complicated and elaborate models
which lower the degrees of freedom in the choice of parameters to at least
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get clear policy conclusions. However, even this at the moment seems some
years away.
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